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amount of $2,347,00. These payments were made by the Second
Injury Fund directly to the injured workers for permanent
partial impairments, without any reimbursement to the insurance
carrier.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The statute which created the Second Injury Fund was
enacted

to encourage the hiring of handicapped workers by

spreading the risk between the Second Injury Fund and the
employer in only those cases where the industrial injury was
aggravated by a pre-existing incapacity, or in cases where the
industrial injury was made substantially greater than it would
have been but for the previous incapacity.

The purpose of the

Second Injury Fund is accomplished in those cases where the
previous incapacity combines with the industrial injury by a
special nexus, such as an aggravation or the substantially
greater test.

By holding the employer responsible for the

industrial injury only and the Second Injury Fund liable for
the previous incapacitites that added specifically to the
combined injuries under U. C. A. Section 35-1-69 of the Utah
Worker's Compensation Act, the employer is encouraged to hire
the handicapped by knowing that it will not be held responsible
for the previous condition which contributes to, or combines
with the industrial injury.
- 3 -

However, in those cases where the prior incapacity adds
nothing to, or does not causally contribute to the temporary total
disability compensation and medical care of an injured worker
following an industrial injury, there should be no apportionment
of liability and no reimbursement to insurance carriers.

In such

cases, the employer's insurer pays only those benefits that were
100% caused by the industrial accident, and the employer, as well
as the Second Injury Fund, are not responsible for medical care
flowing from totally unrelated health problems that have no nexus
with the industrial event.
Allowing reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund on
the basis that the injured worker had a previous health problem
that was "unaggravated and contributed nothing in making the
industrial injury substantially greater" would defeat the purpose
of the Second Injury Fund.

The law specifically requires that the

previous incapacity "combines" with the industrial injury by an
aggravation or by making it substantially greater than it would
be otherwise.
established.

This causal nexus of "combining injuries" must be
Unless these conditions of entitlement are met, the

employer or its insurer shall be liable for all the medical care
and temporary total disbility which was caused solely by the
industrial event.
In the two cases at bar, the prior incapacities were not
aggravated by the industrial accidents, and the previous health
problems did not make the industrial injuries substantially greater

- 4 -

than they would have been otherwise.

Consequently, 100% of

medical benefits were caused by the industrial injury and shall
be the sole responsibility of the employer, without any right of
reimbursement against the Second Injury Fund.

AGRUMENT

POINT I

A 10% IMPAIRMENT FROM THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT DOES
NOT AUTOMATICALLY INVOKE REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE
SECOND INJURY FUND WITHOUT FIRST SHOWING A SUBSTANTIALLY
GREATER REQUIREMENT OR AN AGGRAVATION.

This action for review raises an issue of first
impression on an amendment to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-69 of
the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, enacted by the Utah Legislature
in 1981•

The question to be resolved is what responsibility the

defendant Second Injury Fund has under the amended statute for
impairments which pre-existed the two industrial injuries, but
were not affected by or related to the injuries•
The pertinent portion of Section 69 of the Act, the provision which determines the liability of the Second Injury Fund for
the previous incapacities is as follows:

(A Copy of the entire

provision is included in Appendix A.)
35-1-69, Combined injuries resulting in permanent incapacity
Second Injury Fund — Training of Employee.
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"(1) If any employee who has previously incurred a permanent
incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or congenital
causes, sustains an industrial injury for which either
compensation or medical care, or both, is provided by
this title that results in permanent incapacity which
is substantially greater than he would have incurred if
he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, or which
aggravates or is aggravated by such pre-existing incapacity,
compensation, medical care, and other related items as
outlined in section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the
basis of the combined injuries, but the liability of the
employer for such compensation, medical care, and other
related items shall be for the industrial injury only and
the remainder shall be paid out of the second injury fund
provided for in section 35-1-68 (1).
For purposes of this section, (a) any aggravation of a
pre-existing injury, disease, or congenital cause shall be
deemed "substantially greater", and compensation, medical
care, and other related items shall be awarded on the
basis of the combined injuries as provided above; provided,
however, that (b) where there is no such aggravation,
no award for combined injries shall be made unless the
percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable
to the industrial injury is 10% or greater and the percentage of permanent physical impairment resulting from all
causes and conditions, including the industrial injury,
is greater than 20%. . • ."
In defendant's view, the meaning of the amended statute is
clear.

The plain language of the first paragraph establishes

alternative requirements for entitlement to Second Injury Fund
benefits:

1)

Substantially Greater,

OR

2)

Aggravation.

Either

the pre-existing impairment must have caused the current industrial
impairment to be "substantially greater" than it would have been
otherwise, or the industrial injury must have aggravated or been
aggravated by the pre-existing impairment.
The second paragraph of the amended statute then defines
what is meant by an "aggravation" under the first paragraph.
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Aggravation provides under part (a) that any aggravation of a
pre-existing impairment is automatically deemed substantially
greater for that aggravated pre-existing injury, and that (b)
where there is no aggravation no award for the pre-existing
injury shall be made unless the percentage of impairment attributable to the industrial injury is 10% or greater and the
percentage of impairment resulting from all causes is greater
than 20%. Subdivision (b) is not applicable in the instant
cases because the Commission held that there was no aggravation
or substantially greater as required by the statute.
In order for the plaintiff State Insurance Fund to be
entitled to reimbursement for the payment of industrially related
benefits, it must establish:

1)

That each of the pre-existing

impaired body parts were "aggravated by" the industrial event,
OR

2)

That each of the pre-existing body incapacities made the

industrial injury "substantially greater" than it would have been
otherwise.

The State Insurance Fund has simply failed to show

in either case, the previous incapacities were aggravated by the
industrial injury OR that the industrial injury is now substantially greater because of the pre-existing conditions.
In the case of Mike Maupin, the applicant Maupin sustained
an industrial accident during the course of employment on June 16,
1982, when he fell from a ladder.

The injury resulted in a 5% loss

of bodily function for a sprain of the back, a 15% loss of function
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for psychiatric diagnoses secondary to the industrial event, and
a 17% hearing loss in the right ear.
caused by the industrial accident.

This totals 37% impairment

However, when combined on the

values chart, the resulting industrial impairment was 33%,
Before this accident in 1982, the applicant Maupin had
a previous incapacity of the left hand, which was rated at 22%
of the whole person.

The industrial injury of 1982 did not aggravate

this left hand incapacity, and in addition, the left hand problem
did not make the industrial injuries substantially greater than
they would have been but for the prior hand problem.

In other

words, the pre-existing hand incapacity added nothing to, or
did not contribute to the industrial injuries of the back, psychiatric or hearing loss.
The State Insurance Fund, on appeal, erroneously seeks to
receive a 46% reimbursement of all the medical expenses it paid
in treating the applicant's industrial injuries of the back,
psychiatric and hearing.

The basis for the 46% reimbursement

request is that the applicant Maupin had a pre-existing hand
problem.

This arbitrary request is made without any showing how

the previous hand problem added to, or contributed to the medical
care flowing from the industrial accident.
The Industrial Commission ruled that the employer and/or
its insurer, the State Insurance Fund, were fully responsible
for the industrial injury only.

By the Commission order, the

State Insurance Fund is liable for all the benefits flowing
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directly from the industrial event, including the medical care of
treating the back strain, the psychiatric deficiencies, and the
hearling loss.

In addition, the Commission's order required the

employer's insurer to be responsible for the compensation, such as
the temporary total disability compensation for lost wages and
permanent partial disability for residual impairments sustained
by the applicant.
The final order of the Commission is not arbitrary or
capricious.

The Commission's order is supported by the statutory

langugage of U. C. A. Section 35-1-50 (compensation shall be paid
out of the State Insurance Fund for loss sustained on account of
such injury) and U. C. A. Section 35-1-69 (compensation, medical
care and other related items. , . shall be awarded on the basis
of the combined injuries, but the liability of the employer for
such compensation, medical care, and other related items shall be
for the industrial injury only . . . ) .

In the instant case, all

of the medical costs and temporary total disability were from the
industrial injury only, and therefore, such benefits are the sole
responsiblity of the State Insurance Fund.
The findings of the Commission are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

The final order is supported by the

Medical Panel report of January 10, 1984,
"6.

What percentage of medical costs were due to the industrial accident and what percentage of medical costs
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were due to pre-existing conditions:
Answer:

To the best the panel can determine, 100% would
be due to the industrial conditions involving
this 6-16-82 injury." Emphasis Added.

In the case of David D. Sweeney, the applicant Sweeney
sustained an industrial accident during the course of employment
on July 18/ 1983, when a fiberglass fell and hit Mr. Sweeney on
the head and neck.

The injury resulted in the excision of a

herniated cervical disc, which resulted in an industrial impairment
of 20% of the whole man.

Prior to this neck injury, the applicant

Sweeney had the following previous incapacities:

1)

5% loss of

body function of the lower extremity for a left knee injury;
2)

15% loss of body function of the lower extremity for a left

knee incapacity;

3)

non-industrial injury;

5% loss of body function for a thoracic spine
and

4)

5% loss of body function for left

hand and wrist non-industrial injury.

Based upon the above medical

findings, the Industrial Commission ordered the employer and its
insurance carrier to pay all the medical expenses for the treatment
of the applicant's neck injury, and did not require the employer
to pay any medical costs regarding treatment of the applicant's
pre-existing left knee, thoracic spine, or left hand and wrist.
The employer's insurer now erroneously argues that it
should be reimbursed at 27/42 or 64% of all the medical costs
that it paid for the applicant's July 18, 1983 industrial injury
to his neck.

This contention is made by the State Insurance Fund
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without submitting any evidence on how the previous left knee,
thoracic spine and left hand and wrist added to or contributed
in any way to the treatment of the cervical neck injury.

It is

obvious from the Commission record that 100% of the medical costs
in treating the neck injury were incurred by the industrial event
when the fiberglass fell and hit Mr. Sweeney on the head and neck.
The defendants contend that even if the "substantially
greater test" of Section 69 is not satisfied, the Second Injury
Fund is liable when an "aggravation test" is established.

Recent

amendment to Section 69 provide that the Second Injury Fund may
be liable for benefits if substantially greater permanent incapacity
results, or if the industrial injury aggravates or is aggravated by
such pre-existing incapacity.
The defendant Second Injury Fund concedes its liability for
benefits associated with a pre-existing condition that is aggravated by the accident.

Plaintiff State Insurance Fund erroneously

advances the argument that whenever an industrial injury results in
a 10% impairment all previous incapacities result in Second Injury
Fund reimbursement regardless of their effect on the injury.

To

that end, the State Insurance Fund points to the ratings of 10% or
greater for the injury and greater than 20% combined to argue for
reimbursement when there is no aggravation and no substantially
greater than.
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Even if the applicant does have a 10% industrial
impairment within the meaning of the statute, the unrelated
pre-existing conditions do not give rise to Second Injury Fund
liability.

From its terms it is obvious that subsection 69 (1)

(b) does not create a new form of Second Injury Fund liability.
It operates instead as a limitation on the Fund's liability in
cases where the "substantially greater test" has been satisfied
but there has been no aggravation within the meaning of the
statute.

For example, if a medical panel reported that a

pre-existing condition caused an industrial impairment to be
"substantially greater" than it would have been otherwise, but
the applicant's over-all impairment is less than 20% or the
industrial impairment is less than 10%, no Second Injury Fund
liability arises.

However, the mere fact that an injured

worker has an over-all impairment of 20% and an industrial
impairment of 10% does not automatically entitle him to benefits.
The "substantially greater test" must be satisfied, as provided
for in paragraph one, regardless of the percentage of impairment
involved.

As this Court stated recently in the case of American

Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, Utah Sup. Ct. Case No. 19134, filed May 1,
1984
The first paragraph of amended Section 35-1-69 (1),
with the exception of minor wording changes unrelated
to this appeal, is virtually unchanged in substance

- 12 -

from the pre-1981 statute. The plain meaning of this
paragraph controls the interpretation of the remainder
of 35-1-69 (1).
The purpose of the statute under the controling provision
(first paragraph) was obviously to require two separate tests of
entitlement, and to provide that the "substantially greater"
or the "aggravation" requirements should be applied under different standards of proof.

The new 1981 amendment of the U. C, A,

Section 35-1-69 did not alter the test of "substantially greater."
This test continues to requre some finding of a relationship or
interrelationship between the current industrial event and all
the pre-existing incapacities.
562 P. 2d 617 (Utah 1977);

Intermountain Health Care v. Ortega,

and Intermountain Smelting Corp, v.

Capitano, 610 P.2d 334 (Utah 1980).
In Ortega this Court found a relationship between the
industrial pain problems and the pre-existing psychiatric impairment to rule that such an increase in the industrial injury
satisfies the substantially greater test, Capitano held that the
combined "effects" of both the pre-existing and industrial impairments entitled the applicant to an award of benefits on the theory
that the shifting of weight from the industrial injury of the
right ankle to the prior Korean War injury of the left leg establish
ed an "interrelationship" between the two injuries to justify a
finding that the previous injury adversely effected his new injury.
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The "substantially greater" test therefore requires a
finding of some relationship between the industrial injury and
the pre-existing incapacity or an increase in the industrial
impairment because of the pre-existing incapacities.

As the

Court observed in U. S. F. & G. v. Industrial Commission, 657
P.2d 764-76 (Utah 1983), and has not been modified by the 1981
amendment:
. . . statutory authority exists to apportion compensation
awards. . . provided pertinent conditions are met . . .
(1) (previous) permanent incapacity occasioned by accidental injury, disease or congenital causes, followed by
(2) subsequent injury resulting in further permanent
incapacity which is (3) substantially greater than that
which would have been incurred had there been no pre-existing incapacity. . .therefore. . .the Commission is statutorily obligated to determine whether the subsequent injuries
sustained . . have resulted in further permanent incapacity
which is substantially greater.
This Court conclusively resovled the issue of "substantially
greater" in Day's Market, Inc. v. Muir, 669 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983).
In Day's Market the Commission denied the worker combined benefits
under Section 69 because he had failed to show how the pre-existing
incapacity had the "effect" of substantially increasing the current
industrial impairment.

The Court held:

(Second Injury) Fund's only application is where the
current incapacity is substantially greater. . .this
language requires a finding as to the effect the preexisting incapacity has upon the current incapacity.
Findings in the abstract as to the total pre-existing
incapacity are of little assistance in making this
determination, since the full responsiblity falls upon
the current employer unless it can be said that the current
incapacity is substantially greater than it would have
been "but for" the pre-existing incapacity.
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From the total language of the statue, it is clear
that "any aggravation" of an indivdual body part meets the
test of "substantially greater" for that aggravated body part.
And where there is no aggravation no combined injuries shall be
found unless the percentage of phycial impairment from the
industrial injury is 10% or greater and the impairment resulting
from all causes is greater than 20%. The words "any aggravation"
simply means that there may be an aggravation of any body part.
An aggravation is not restricted to certain physical structures of
the body.

Thus, an aggravation of a prior back problem entitles

an insurer to reimbursement.

But where the industrial injury is

to the back and the prior health problem is to a finger, this is
not an aggravation and the employer is not entitled to reimbursement.
The requirement of "any aggravation" under this definition
requires a "causal connection" between the current industrial
impairment and the previous incapacity.

In the instant cases,

no such "causal connection" was made between the industrial injury
and the prior incapacities.

The amended statute is clear that

in those cases where there is no aggravation no benefits shall be
awarded for those non-aggravated body parts without CL showing that
the prior unrelated health problems have made the industrial injury
substantially greater and in addition, the industrial impairment
was 10% or greater and the combined injuries were greater than
20%.

In the two cases at bar, the percentage ratings are establish-
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edf but the "substantially greater" requirement under the
controlling provision of the statute has not been established.
Consequently, the Industrial Commission denied both employers
the right of reimbursement where all the benefits flowing from
the injuries were the direct cause of the industrial accident*
Should this Court adopt the plaintiff State Insurance
Fund's erroneous contention that they should be reimbursed solely
under the 10/20 ratings for all payments made in treating the
industrial injuries, the decision would result in the Second Injury
Fund reimbursing all future cases for countless totally unrelated
health problems, such as hearing and vision loss, heart and lung
conditions, obesity, arthritis, diabetes, alcoholishm and learning disabilities due to previous conditions that existed before
the industrial injury.

Reimbursements solely because of 10/20

percentages will allow a windfall to the employer, without
requiring the employer to make a showing of how the previous
incapacities effected the injured worker's industrial injuries to
make it "substantially greater" or whether the previous body
impairments were "aggravated by" the current accident.

Such a

result would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Worker's
Compensation Act which is to apportion liability for the ultimate
effects of the industrial injuries, but not to provide a general
health insurance program for any and all health problems a worker
suffers.

- 16 -

Considering the statutory scheme of the amendment to
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-69 and the cited cases, a clear
reading of the Act establishes the following:

a)

the prior

incapacities did not make the current injuries substantially
greater;

and

b)

the industrial injuries did not aggravate or

was not aggravated by the pre-existing incapacities,. Therefore,
no provision in the statute demands that the Commission should
rule that the insurer should receive Worker's Compensation
reimbursement for unrelated health impairments.

The State

Insurance Fund's position is in conflict with the plain language
of the amendment and is based on an assumption that the Utah
Legislature intended by the amendment to expand the Worker's
Compensation Act to reach health problems completely unrelated
to employment conditions, an assumption which is totally
unfounded.

POINT II

EMPLOYER'S INSURANCE CARRIER IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REIMBURSEMENT FOR BENEFITS INCURRED DIRECTLY FROM AN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT, WHERE THE PRIOR PROBLEMS ADDED NOTHING
TO THE INDUSTRIAL BENEFITS.

The plaintiff erroneously argues that based upon the
current industrial accident, the employer should be entitled to
reimbursement from the defendant because the injured worker had

- 17 -

a previous condition, although the prior incapacities were totally
unrelated to the injuries and treatment of those accident caused
injuries.
In the two entitled matters, the Commission has ruled that
since the applicant's medical expenses arose from the industrial
events, the payment of benefits was the exclusive responsibility
of the employer.

The position taken by the Commission is that

before the employer is entitled to reimbursement under Section 69,
the insurer is required to show that the previous incapacities made
the industrial injuries "substantially greater" but for the prior
incapacities.

Day's Market v. Muir, 669 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983);

Kincheloe v. Coca-cola Bottling Co. of Ogden, 656 P.2d 764 (Utah 1982) .
Or, a prima facie showing of an aggravation is required under the
new threshold.
Very simply, in the two cases at bar, the Commission
denied the insurer any reimbursement from the defendant Second
Injury Fund because all of the medical and temporary total
disability benefits resulted from the industrial injuries only,
which were the sole responsibility of the employer's insurance
carrier.

Clearly, the statute requires a showing of how the

previous incapacities have acted upon the current industrial
injury to make the new impairment substantially greater than it
would have been "but for" the previous incapacities, or a showing
of an aggravation of the prior condition.

The plaintiff erron-

eously applies an additive analysis to the above statute to argue
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that the insurer ought to receive reimbursement of all benefits
flowing from the industrial injuries because the injuries combined
up to greater than 20%. Such an application is contrary to the
intent of the statute.

As Professor Larson stated in describ-

ing the function of the Second Injury Funds in the American
Law of Worker's Compensation generally:
Necessity that second injury add to prior
disability
Although the prior impairment
need not combine with the compensable injury
in any special way, it must add something to
the disability before the special fund can
become liable. In other words, it is not
enough to show that claimant had some kind
of handicap, if that contributed nothing to
the final disability. For, example, pre-existing partial loss of hearing was not a basis for
shifting part of compensation liability to the
Special Fund when the ultimate disability took
the form of silicosis or an injured hand.
Larson on Worker's Compensation at 59.32 (g).
The defendant Second Injury Fund is not liable for
benefits relating to the applicant's pre-existing unrelated
incapacities because they did not make the industrial impairment substantially greater, or were not aggravated by such.
Nothing in subsection (b) of paragraph two of Utah Code Ann.
Section 35-1-69 (1) expands the responsibility of the Second
Injury Fund to reach unrelated health problems.

On the contrary,

this provision is a limitation on the Fund's liability, eliminating cases where impairment ratings are below the specified
level from those for which the fund is liable.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the Industrial Commission's
final Order by holding that before insurance carriers are
entitled to reimbursement benefits from the special fund under
the 1981 amendment to Section 35-1-69, the "Substantially
Greater" requirement QR the "Aggravation" test must be
statutorily satisfied on each and every pre-existing body part.
DATED THIS

day of July, 1985.

G m ^ e r ^ A. M a r t i n e z , i
A t t o r n e y for Second /injury Fund
and Industrial Commission
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APPENDIX A

35-1-69. Combined injuries resulting in permanent
incapacity - Payment out of second injury fund - Training of
employee« (1) If any employee who has previously incurred
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or
congenital causes, sustaines an industrial injury for which
either compensation and or medical care, or both, is provided by this title that results in permanent incapacity
which is substantially greater than he would have incurred
if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, or which
aggravates or ijs aggravated by such pre-existing incapacity,
compensation and, medical care, whieh-medfteal-eare and other
related items are as outlined in section 35-1-81, shall be
awarded on the basis' of the combined injuries, but the
liability of the employer for such compensation and medical
care, and other related items shall be for the industrial
injury only and the remainder shall be paid out of the
epeeial second injury fund provided for in section 35-1-68(1)
hereinafter refe***^ te as the ^speeial-ffcnd11.
For purposes of this section, (ai) any aggravation of a
pre-existincf injury, disease or congenital cause shall be
deemed "substantially greater". and compensation, medical
care, and other related items shall be awarded on the basis
of the combined injuries as provided above, provided,
however, that (b) where there is no such aggravation, no
award for combined injuries shall be made unless the percentage
of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial
injury is 10% or greater and the percentage of permanent
physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions,
including the industrial injuryf is greater than 20%.
Where the pre-existing incapacity referred to in subsection (1)
(b) of this section previously has been compensated for,
in whole or in part, as a permanent partial disability under
this act or the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law,
such compensation shall be deducted from the liability
assessed to the second injury fund under this paragraph.
Where the payment of temporary disability benefits,
medical expenses, or other related items are required as
j* result of the industrial injury subject to this section,
*the employer or its insurance carrier shall be responsible
for all such temporary benefits, medical care, or other
related items up to the end of the period of temporary
total disability resulting from the industrial injury.
Any allocation of disability benefits, medical carer or
other related items following such period shall be made

between %he employer or its insurer and the second injury fund
as provided for herein, and any payments made by the employer
or its insurance Carrier in excess of its proportionate
share shall be recoverable at the time of the award for
combined disabilities if any is made hereunder.
A medical panel having the qualifications of the medical
panel set forth in section 35-2-56, shall review all medical
aspects of the case and determine first, the total permanent
physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions
including the industrial injury; second, the percentage of
permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial
injury; and third, the percentage of permanent physical
impairment attributable to the previously existing condition or
conditions, whether due to accidental injury, disease or
congenital causes. The industrial commission shall then
assess the liability for permanent partial disability
compensation and future medical care to the employer on
the basis of the percentage of permanent physical impairment
attributable to the industrial injury only and the remainder
any amounts remaining to be paid hereunder shall be payable out of the said speeial second injury fund; provided,
however, that medical expenses shall be paid in the first
instance by the employer of its insurance carrier. Amounts,
if any, which have been paid by the employer in excess
of the portion attributable to the said industrial injury
shall be reimbursed to the employer out of said special
the second injury fund upon written request and verification
of amounts so expended.
(2) In addition the commission in its discretion may
increase the weekly compensation rates to be paid out of
such special fund, such increase to be used for the
rehabilitation and training of any employee coming within
the provisions of this chapter as may be certified to
the commission by the rehabilitation department of the
state board of education as being eligible for rehabilitation
and training; provided, however, that in no case shall
there be paid out of such special fund for rehabilitation
an amount in excess of $1,000.

